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1. WOULD PRESIDENT OBAMA HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD A
U.S. CITIZEN WITHOUT CHARGE IN A MILITARY BRIG FOR SIX MONTHS
IF THAT CITIZEN-WHO LIVES IN MINNESOTA-IS SUSPECTED OF LINKS
TO AL QAEDA FOLLOWING A ONE-MONTH TRIP TO SOMALIA?
Initially, the answer to this question appears simple. The Gov-
ernment suspects a U.S. citizen who is present in the United States of
links to al Qaeda, which raises the possibility of a criminal prosecution
for crimes such as material support of terrorism.' Investigators may
seek to question him, but they must inform him of some of his rights,
and he can invoke his right to remain silent and/or counsel and
thereby end the interrogation. In addition, investigators cannot keep
him in custody unless they arrest him, but they ordinarily cannot
arrest him unless they have probable cause to believe he has commit-
ted a crime. Similarly, they probably cannot conduct a search of his
home without a warrant, which again requires probable cause. Once
arrested, he has a right to bail-that is, to qualified liberty-unless the
Government can show exceptional circumstances (flight risk or
2danger to others) to justify holding him in pretrial detention. At
some point, he will be brought to trial and, if convicted, will serve a
sentence. If the sentence is less than life imprisonment, he will at
some point be released .
Contrast this approach with an equally straightforward scenario.
1. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2009).
2. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). As David Cole has pointed
out, there have long been exceptions to this approach, and those exceptions have
seen significant and in some circumstances abusive use in the context of anti-
terrorism activities. See David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Terrorism,
and War, 97 CAL. L. REV. 693, 695, 698 (2009). Despite these exceptions, the
presumption of freedom from physical restraint absent a warrant or probable cause
has remained a general rule.
3. The Non-Detention Act is also important to this hypothetical: "No citizen
shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an
Act of Congress." 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (a) (2006). In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004), the Supreme Court held that the Authorization to Use Military Force, Pub. L.
No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001), satisfied the terms of the Act with
respect to citizens who were also enemy combatants involved in the conflict in
Afghanistan. Hamde's analysis does not automatically apply to a person who is linked
to al Qaeda but not to the conflict in Afghanistan, and who is present in the United
States. At that point, the questions become (1) does the AUMF trump the Non-
Detention Act nonetheless, (2) are there other statutes that would allow non-criminal
detention, and (3) is there some inherent executive authority to detain notwithstand-
ing the Act? These are critical legal issues, which the Supreme Court deliberately
avoided answering in Rumsfeld v. Padi4a, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). My analysis of this
question will take a different path, however.
5142 [Vol. 36:5
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The Government suspects an alien in another country of engaging in
criminal activity. The Government could ask the government of that
other country to extradite the person to the United States to face trial.
Or, in certain circumstances, the person could become the target of
covert actions, including searches, kidnapping, or perhaps even
killing.4 Actions of this kind are obviously controversial for a variety
of reasons, but they nonetheless take place, and until recently the
extent to which the Constitution had anything to say about them was
debatable. 5 Importantly, too, military action has generally been
thought to be entirely separate from both of these scenarios, and it
has had its own set of rules, including rules relating to detention.
Over the past decade and more, these simple scenarios have be-
come increasingly uncertain. Military and law enforcement activities
often overlap, particularly but not exclusively with respect to terror-
ism. 6 Good reasons exist to take seriously the claim that the United
States should have the authority to hold some people in custody
without charges for extended periods of time, perhaps even indefi-
nitely. 7 Even as courts have begun to craft more constitutional rules
to govern the conduct of U.S. officials outside the incorporated
territory of the United States,8 the protections assumed to apply to
citizens (and aliens) inside that territory have become less clear. 9
That is to say, the blurring of old boundaries between territorial and
extraterritorial powers and rights, which at first appears to have led to
the expansion of rights, has also upset previously settled links between
citizenship, territory, government powers, and individual rights. 0 The
4. See infra answer to Question Two.
5. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990); Ethan A. Nadelmann, TheEvolution of United
States Involvment in the International Rendition ofFugitive Criminals, 25 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L.
& POL. 813 (1993); see also infra answer to Question Two.
6. SeeJohn T. Parry, Terrorism and the New Criminal Process, 15 WM. & MARYBILL
RTs.J. 765, 767 (2007). An early example might be the military invasion of Panama in
part for the purpose of arresting Manuel Noriega.
7. See Robert Chesney &Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal
and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079 (2008); Cole, supra note 2; Amos
N. Guiora &John T. Parry, Debate, Light at the End of the Pipeline?: Choosing a Forumfor
Suspected Terrorists, 156 U. PA. L, REV. PENNuMBRA 356 (2008).
8. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2259 (2008); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507 (2004).
9. As the Supreme Court's failure to reach the merits in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542
U.S. 426 (2004), makes clear. See also al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir.
2008) (en banc), in which the Fourth Circuit divided 5-4 on executive power to
detain as an enemy combatant an alien residing in the United States.
10. For a good discussion of extraterritoriality in U.S. law, see KAL RAUSTIALA,
DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE EvOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN
51432010]
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result is a more functional approach to legal rules relating to
citizenship and territory, both in general and with respect to individu-
al rights.
Put somewhat differently, I do not think it is clear as a formal
matter that a citizen inside the United States automatically can claim
the full package of federal constitutional rights. Rather, the extent to
which such a person can claim rights must depend on an analysis of
functional considerations. Justice Souter said as much in his Hamdi
concurrence: "in a moment of genuine emergency, when the
Government must act with no time for deliberation, the Executive
may be able to detain a citizen if there is reason to fear he is an
imminent threat to the safety of the Nation and its people."'" As
Justice Souter's statement also suggests, the result of the functional
analysis will usually be that the claimed rights will apply. Thus, the
specific answer to the specific hypothetical posed in Question One is
"No." But it remains critical that the analysis that produces this
answer is (1) different from the analysis with which I began my
answer, and (2) capable of generating different results in a subset of
cases-such as emergencies-in which functional considerations favor
the exercise of government power despite a claim of right.
In short, the answer to Question One is less interesting than the
fact that the answer is uncertain enough to make the question worth
asking. Reaching a conclusion requires what appears to be a shift of
thought, a realigning of legal categories and legal balances away from
the relatively formal analysis with which I began. It is tempting to say
that 9/11 is the reason for this shift, but these changes were well
underway long before 2001. The War on Terror only accelerated
them. In the end, the question whether the President can hold aU.S.
citizen without charge in a military brig for six months if that citizen is
suspected of links to al Qaeda is not very different from any other
inquiry into the relative scope of government powers and individual
rights. As the Supreme Court observed in a case that had nothing to
do with national security or terrorism, "the precise content of most of
the Constitution's civil liberties guarantees rests upon an assessment
of what accommodation between governmental need and individual
freedom is reasonable."'
2
AMERIcAN LAw (2009).
11. 542 U.S. at 552. Justice Souter did not limit his statement to situations
involving citizens detained overseas.
12. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643-44 (1987); see also Parry, Teforim
supra note 6, at 796-822.
5144 [Vol. 36:5
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2. WOULD IT BE LEGAL FOR THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION TO
LAUNCH A PREDATOR STRIKE ON OSAMA BIN LADEN IF HE HAS BEEN
TRACKED TO A HOUSE ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF KARACHI, PAKISTAN?
The facts of this question are not very hypothetical. The Obama
administration, like its predecessors, uses Predator drones to kill
specific, targeted individuals and likely will continue to do so."'
Indeed, "the number of drone strikes has risen dramatically since
Obama became President," and drones killed well over 300 people in
Pakistan in 2009.14 From an operational perspective, then, the only
reason the administration would not send a drone to kill Osama bin
Laden would be if it did not want to kill him-that is, if it preferred to
take him alive or leave him at large. With respect to that choice, I
read the question to exclude the politics, wisdom, ethics, or morality
of using Predator drones for military or other purposes, and so I will
not address those issues.' 5
U.S. statutory law permits executive officials to use Predator
drones in an attempt to kill Osama bin Laden. 6 The Authorization to
Use Military Force provides "the President is authorized to use all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations,
or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001."'" Bin
Laden is one of the "persons" determined to have been responsible
13. SeeJane Mayer, The Predator War: What are the Risks of the C.I.A. 's Covert Drone
Program?, THE NEwYORKER, Oct. 26, 2009, at 36-45 ("The U.S. government runs two
drone programs. The military's version, which is publicly acknowledged, operates in
the recognized war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq.... The C.I.A.'s program is aimed
at terror suspects around the word, including in countries where U.S. troops are not
based.").
14. Id.
15. I am not asserting a strong separation between these issues and legal issues,
and I recognize that the legal doctrines I will discuss do implicate and draw upon
ethical, moral, and political judgment. But I will make no effort to shade my legal
discussion to suit my views on these other issues; nor will I advocate for changing the
law to reflect my views.
16. The word "attempt" is important, especially to the politics, wisdom, ethics,
and morality of drone strikes. Predator drones usually go where they are supposed to
go, but the intelligence information that guides targeting decisions frequently is not
accurate, so that instead of killing the intended target, drones tend to kill people who
were not targets and-often-who had no connection to the targeted person. See
Mayer, supra note 13; Mary Ellen O'Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones, A
Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: THE LAW GOVERNiNG LETHAL
FORCE IN CONTEXT (Simon Bronitt ed.) (forthcoming), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501144.
17. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat.
224, 224 (2001).
2010] 5145
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for the 9/11 attacks, and drone strikes are obviously a form of force.
Although one can debate what kinds of force are "necessary and
appropriate," the use of Predator drones seems to fall well within the
kinds of actions that the Bush and Obama administrations have taken
pursuant to the statute. Thus, the hypothetical does not require
asking the harder question of what inherent or emergency authority
the President might have in such a situation.
Nor is there much question about the general constitutionality of
engaging in Predator drone strikes under the auspices of the AUMF.
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum,
for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all
that Congress can delegate.... If his act is held unconstitu-
tional under these circumstances, it usually means that the
Federal Government, as an undivided whole, lacks power. A
seizure executed by the President pursuant to an Act of
Congress would be supported by the strongest of presump-
tions and the widest latitude ofjudicial interpretation, and
the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who
might attack it.'9
The decision that drone strikes should be an option for accom-
plishing military or national security goals that Congress has validated
seems easily to fit within the power of the federal government.
Congress has expressly authorized the President to use force against
people involved in the 9/11 attacks. Speaking generally, the Constitu-
tion allows the government to use offensive and defensive military
force to accomplish national goals. UnderJusticeJackson's analysis,
the wisdom or appropriateness of acts authorized by Congress and
permitted by the Constitution-in this case, the wisdom or appro-
priateness of using drone strikes to target and kill specific individu-
als-is not an issue for judicial review.
From a constitutional perspective, then, the only significant ques-
tion would be whether the Constitution imposes any requirements on
how the government carries out drone strikes in specific cases. In
particular, do the potential targets of such strikes have any rights that
would limit the ability of the United States to carry out an attack?
Richard Murphy andJohn Radsan have argued that due process (1)
18. See William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted Killing and Assassination:
The US. Legal Framework, 37 U. RicH. L. REv. 667, 724, 736-37 (2003); see also id at
682-737 (canvassing non-constitutional U.S. law on the legality of targeted killing).
19. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952)
(Jackson,J., concurring).
5146 [Vol, 36:5
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permitsjudicial review of targeted killing decisions and (2) demands
20
internal executive review. Put differently, under their analysis,
targeted killing is constitutional so long as the government complies
with relatively lenient due process requirements.
A slightly different answer to the question of rights-one which I
think is consistent with my answer to Question One-might begin
with the fact that in the hypothetical, bin Laden is not on U.S.-
controlled territory of any kind and is not in U.S. custody. He is also
not a U.S. citizen; nor does he have any of the legal rights sometimes
accorded to aliens under U.S. statutes. His only connections to the
United States are his actions against the United States and U.S.
citizens and residents, and the efforts of U.S. personnel to track him
down. Under these circumstances, which are quite different from
those of detainees at Guantanamo (or at other locations around the
world), his rights against U.S. action are minimal and possibly
nonexistent. In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court stated that
extraterritorial enforcement of the Constitution turns on a functional
analysis of three factors: citizenship, the "nature of the sites" at which
the relevant conduct took place, and "practical obstacles.",2  With
respect to the third factor, the Court seemed to indicate that the
burden of proving "obstacles" would rest with the government, for it
stressed the question whether issuing the writ of habeas corpus
"would be 'impracticable or anomalous.',
22
In contrast to Murphy and Radsan's interpretation of Boumediene
as requiring due process review, the alternative argument would stress
that the first two factors--citizenship and location-clearly weigh
against enforcement of due process rights, and that allowing due
process review of Predator drone strikes would be impractical and
anomalous. One could use this flexible framework-especially the
third factor, to the extent it has overriding weight-to conclude that
due process requires some kind of executive review. But, I think one
could just as easily determine that due process does not apply at all or
that, if it does, it simply requires compliance with ordinary govern-
ment processes, which congressional passage of the AUMF would
20. Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of
Terrorists, 31 CARDnozo L. REV. 405 (2009). For a somewhat different view, written
before Bourmediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), see Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra
note 18, at 678-79 (concluding the Constitution does not prohibit targeted killing).
21. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259. The specific issue for the Boumediene Court
was "the reach of the Suspension Clause." Id.
22. Id. at 2262 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
2010] 5147
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satisfy. By contrast, people in different situations could claim greater
levels of protection under due process or other constitutional rights.
Under either approach, the Constitution places few constraints
on the President's ability to use Predator drone strikes against non-
citizens outside the United States.2 3 The legal issues thus reduce to
whether the use of Predator drone strikes complies with international
law. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that the United
States is engaged in a non-international armed conflict with al Qaeda
for purposes of the Geneva Conventions.24 The Court did not define
"al Qaeda" or its -membership, but it is difficult to imagine any U.S.
definition that would not include bin Laden. As a state engaged in an
armed conflict, the United States can target and kill combatants, but
any use of force must be consistent with military necessity and avoid
harm to civilians. Defining the border between "combatant" and
"civilian" can be difficult both practically and theoretically. Murphy
and Radsan suggest that "all of these limits are hazy and subject to
interpretation," but they also argue that these limits impose some
restrictions on the use of drone strikes no matter whom the target.
25
In addition, the hypothetical provides that the attack would tar-
get bin Laden in Pakistan, where the United States is already using
drone strikes. But the United States is not engaged in an armed
conflict with Pakistan. Perhaps the United States still can make the
attack-otherwise how could it ever go after members of al Qaeda?
But Mary Ellen O'Connell argues that in the absence of an armed
conflict, international human rights law should apply, such that the
use of drone strikes is illegal. Further, to the extent an armed conflict
now exists within Pakistan, and to the extent the United States is
assisting the government of Pakistan in its efforts to maintain order,
she points out that the use of drone strikes must comply with the law
23. A third due process analysis might focus less on bin Laden and more on the
fact that the decision to target him would be made by U.S. officials, at least some of
whom would be in the United States. Thus, whether or not bin Laden can claim any
rights, due process still should constrain official action because "[t] he United States is
entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source.
It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution."
Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6 (plurality opinion) (making this statement in the context of
rights claimed by a citizen). Under this analysis, which circles back toward that of
Murphy and Radsan, some form of process and authority is necessary before the use
of a Predator drone. But passage of the AUMF and the use of established military
and intelligence processes might well be sufficient.
24. 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006).
25. See Muphy & Radsan, supra note 20.
[Vol. 36:55148
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of armed conflict. 6 Whether the United States can claim to be
assisting Pakistan is also not clear. The increasing use of drone strikes
has drawn protests from some Pakistani officials even as the Obama
administration is reportedly cooperating with the Pakistani govern-
ment on some targeting decisions.
I will not provide any independent analysis of these issues. Suf-
fice it to say that the answers are not entirely clear. Murphy and
Radsan argue that international law should limit, and O'Connell
argues that it should prevent, the use of Predator drone strikes under
the circumstances presented by the hypothetical. Jordan Paust
appears to disagree with O'Connell and to agree somewhat with
Radsan and Murphy. 2" The United States could, of course, offer a
legal justification for these strikes. Further, to the extent some of
these rules are customary international law and are notjus cogens, the
United States is permitted to engage in conduct that seeks to change
them. Yet the United States is not doing either of these things.
Instead, it has largely ignored international law,2 which is fairly easy
to do because the status and enforceability of these rules in U.S.
domestic law is uncertain.30 That is to say, the conduct of the United
States reflects Brian Tamanaha's observation that "the most powerful
states... disregard international law by their leave when they consider
it necessary for perceived national interest. 3' For supporters of an
international rule of law, this disregard is potentially devastating.3
2
From the perspective of U.S. law, in short, no legal constraints
exist that would place meaningful or enforceable limits on the use of
Predator drone strikes. The perspective of international law on this
26. See O'Connell, supra note 16.
27. See Mayer, supra note 13; O'Connell, supra note 16.
28. SeeJordanJ. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of
US. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 TRANSNAT'L L & POL'Y (forthcoming 2010),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmn?abstractid=1520717.
29. See O'Connell, supra note 16 ("The United States has apparently not put
forward a position as to why it believes its use of drones in Pakistan is lawful under
international law."). State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh gave a speech in
March 2010 at the annual meeting of the American Society of International Law, in
which he asserted that the United States is limiting its attacks to military objectives
and is seeking to minimize collateral damage, but he provided little supporting
analysis.
30. 1 will not attempt to address the myriad issues that surround the status and
enforceability of international law in U.S. courts and the U.S. legal system.
31. BRIAN TAMANAHA, ON THE RuLE OF LAW: HIsTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 128
(2004).
32. But see id. at 131 (suggesting a basis for perceiving an international rule of
law even when international law is violated).
2010] 5149
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issue seems to matter little to the executive branch under Bush or
Obama. The real issues are therefore the ethical, moral, and political
questions that are beyond the scope of the hypothetical, and which
reduce to the question of when, if ever, is it appropriate and wise to
use such strikes.
3. DID MEMBERS OF THEJUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S OFFICE OF LEGAL
COUNSEL COMMIT MALPRACTICE IN 2002 BY ADVISING THAT THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS DID NOT APPLY TO AL QAEDA AND THE
TALIBAN?
4. DID MEMBERS OF THEJUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S OFFICE OF LEGAL
COUNSEL COMMIT MALPRACTICE IN 2002 BY ITS WRITTEN GUIDANCE
TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ON INTERROGATION
STANDARDS?
"Legal malpractice" is the "failure to render professional services
with the skill, prudence, and diligence that an ordinary and reasona-
ble lawyer would use under similar circumstances." In assessing an
attorney's compliance with this standard, courts usually hold that "an
error ofjudgment on an unsettled proposition of law" is not malprac-
tice, so long as the attorney complied with the duty to "research and
investigate doubtful propositions." Further, "courts usually agree
that violation of an ethics rule alone does not create a cause of action,
constitute legal malpractice perse, compel disqualification or necessar-
ily create a duty. 35 Yet because the standard is objective negligence,
"good faith" is not a defense. Thus, an attorney can act in complete
good faith yet still commit malpractice. Finally, malpractice liability
usually runs between attorney and client, although the doctrine of
privity is not as strong as it once was, and attorneys are sometimes
liable to non-clients for intentional torts.3 6
Within this framework, I do not have enough expertise in the
laws of war to give a definite answer to Question Three. I am inclined
to say, however, that OLC's advice on the Geneva Conventions was
not malpractice in a legal or rhetorical sense. Despite the fact that
the Geneva memoranda espouse what I think are extreme positions
33. BLAcK's LAW DICIONARY978 (8th ed. 2004).
34. 2 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 19.1 at 1226 & §
19.6 at 1241 (2009). See also i& § 20.1 at 1305 ("Negligence ... cannot be inferred
from a bad result or even from an error.").
35. I& § 15.5, at 691.
36. See id., chs. 6 & 7.
5150 [Vol. 36:5
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on the constitutional scope of presidential power, they also take
account of and discuss the applicable rules, evaluate at least some
opposing views, and canvass some of the secondary literature.
Importantly for public policy purposes, OLC's advice on this is-
sue came as part of a debate with State Department attorneys over the
proper approach.37 Thus, the people, including the President, who
actually made the relevant decisions were able to weigh and consider
a fairly broad range of views-to the extent they cared to do so. Yet
one could argue that this debate strengthens the claim that something
about OLC's conduct on this issue fell short of appropriate standards,
for rather than giving advice, OLC took what I would describe as a
litigation posture against the State Department. Its Geneva memo-
randa tend to read like adversarial documents, not like the measured
analysis and advice that many people, including many former OLC
attorneys, believe is the appropriate genre or stance for the OLC to
adopt.3
a
With respect to Question Four, the argument for malpractice is
much stronger. First, the famous August 1, 2002 "torture" memoran-
dum fails the non-doctrinal test of measured analysis and advice that I
mentioned above. And, although I am willing to believe that OLC
attorneys acted in good faith when they wrote the memoranda, the
existence of good faith has little or no relevance to the question of
37. The various memoranda from officials in the Defense, Justice, and State
Departments and the White House, as well as President Bush's decision memoran-
dum, are in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 38-143 (Karen J.
Greenberg &Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE TORTURE PAPERS].
38. SeeWalter E. Dellinger, et al., Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel
(Dec. 21, 2004) ("When providing legal advice to guide contemplated executive
branch action, OLC should provide an accurate and honest appraisal of applicable
law, even if that advice will constrain the administration's pursuit of desired policies.
The advocacy model of lawyering, in which lawyers craft merely plausible legal
arguments to support their clients' desired actions, inadequately promotes the
President's constitutional obligation to ensure the legality of executive action."),
available at
http://www.acslaw.org/files/2004%20programs-OLC%20principles~white%20paper
.pdf. Note that nearly all of the attorneys who signed this statement of principles
worked for OLC during the Clinton administration. Whether or not the motives of
those who wrote and signed the document were political, it does not read as a
partisan document. Whether it is a historically accurate picture of how OLC has
operated during other administrations-including during the Clinton administra-
tion-is a topic well outside the scope of Questions Three and Four. For additional
perspectives on these issues, see HAROLD H. BRuFF, BADADVICE: BUSH'S LAWYERS IN THE
WAR ON TERROR 67-91 (2009); David Cole, Introduaory Commentary: Torture Law, in
THE TORTURE MEMOS: RATIONALIZING THE UNTHiNKABLE 11-13 (David Cole ed. 2009);
and JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW ANDJUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 32-39 (2007).
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malpractice. Still, to the extent the specifics of malpractice doctrine
are relevant to the question, the posture in which a malpractice claim
over this memorandum could arise is important. To whom did OLC
attorneys owe a duty? Was their client the Department ofJustice, the
CIA, the President or executive branch in general, the nation, or the
American people? Should the memorandum be read as part of a
conspiracy to commit intentional torts against people detained as
suspected terrorists, so that they could be liable to third parties? Was
the memorandum the proximate cause of injury? To the extent the
issue is ordinary negligence that comprises a breach of a duty owed to
a client defined in relatively narrow terms-for example, the execu-
tive branch 9-then Question Four poses a hypothetical that will
probably never be litigated.
But, whether or not the analysis in the torture memorandum is
malpractice in a strict doctrinal sense, it goes at least to the edge of
ethical conduct and arguably could support criminal charges.40 More
bluntly and most certainly, it was very bad advice.4 1 For example,
Kathleen Clarke has laid particular stress on three major substantive
inaccuracies: reliance on a Medicare statute to set the standard for
severe pain under the federal torture statute; the discussion of
available defenses under the statute, garticularly the necessity defense;
and the scope of executive power. I differ a bit from Clarke on
exactly what is wrong with the memorandum, but I agree that it is
severely flawed, particularly with respect to the level of pain necessary
43to constitute torture.
Last spring, the Department ofJustice released several previously
classified memoranda, including another from August 1, 2002 (which
David Luban has labeled the "techniques" memorandum to distin-
guish it from the "torture" memorandum of the same date) and three
39. See Dellinger, et al., supra note 38, at 4-6 (referring to "client agency" or
"agencies").
40. SeeJens Ohlin, The Torture Lauyers, 51 HARv. INT'L L.J. 193 (2010).
41. See BRUFF, supra note 38, at 237-52.
42. Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1J. NAT'L
SEC. L. & POL'Y 455, 459-62 (2005); see also Cole, supra note 38, at 19-25; GOLDSMITH,
supra note 38, at 144-51; What Went Wrong: Torture and the Office of Legal Counsel in the
Bush Administration: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the
Courts of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 111 th Cong. May 13, 2009) [hereinafter
What Went Wrong] (written statement of David Luban) (discussing these and other
flaws in the memorandun, including failure to cite controlling or relevant cases,
including a 1984 federal case on water torture).
43. SeejOHNT. PARRY, UNDERSTANDING TORTURE: LAW, VIOLENCE, AND POLITICAL
IDENTITY 175-77 (2010).
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from May 2005." As Luban notes, these additional memoranda claim
to provide OLC's "best" and "authoritative" understandings of the law
that should govern the executive branch with respect to coercive
interrogation techniques.
The August 1, 2002 techniques memorandum gave specific legal
approval to ten coercive interrogation practices that the CIA wanted
to use on a high-ranking member of al Qaeda. The practices were:
(1) attention grasp, (2) walling, (3) facial hold, (4) facial
slap (insult slap), (5) cramped confinement, (6) wall stand-
ing, (7) stress positions, (8) sleep deprivation, (9) insects
placed in a confinement box, and (10) the waterboard.
45
One easily could conclude that some or most of these methods
are illegal and/or torture under U.S. or international law. Yet OLC
applied the torture memorandum of the same date to conclude that
these methods, whether used singly or in combination, would not
violate U.S. law, in part because they "would not inflict severe physical
pain or suffering" and would not cause "any prolonged mental
harm. 46
The May 2005 memoranda-which technically are not part of
Question Four-also gave approval to a similar set of specific tech-
niques used together or in combination. I agree with David Luban's
assessment that, although the analysis in these memoranda is "more
cautious," it remains "troubling" and is at times "so implausible that it
seems clear that Mr. Bradbury was straining to reach a result.,
47
In sum, whether or not the 2002 memoranda (or the 2005 me-
moranda) meet the standards for malpractice liability, OLC attorneys
clearly failed their client, whether that client was the CIA, the
executive branch, or the country. Their advice was bad advice not
simply because it was sometimes incorrect or unbalanced, but also
44. All of the available interrogation memoranda are collected in THE TORTURE
MEMOS: RATIONALIZING THE UNTHINKABLE, supra note 38.
45. Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting
General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, re: Interrogation of al Qaeda
Operative 2 (Aug. 1, 2002).
46. Id. at 11, 16-17.
47. What Went Wrong, supra note 42; see also Cole, supra note 38, at 27-34. One
reason Bradbury's memoranda are more cautious is that they had to take account of
OLC's withdrawal of the August 2002 torture memorandum and the substitution of a
December 30,2004 memorandum written by Daniel Levin. The Levin memorandum
still allows room for coercive practices, but it retreats from many of the claims in the
earlier memorandum. For somewhat different discussions of these events and the
December 2004 memorandum, see Cole, supra note 38, at 25-26, and GOLDSMITH,
supra note 38, at 141-61, 164-65.
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and perhaps even more because OLC knew that the administration
wanted a green light to use rough tactics, and the CIA wanted to be
able to claim that it relied on OLC's favorable interpretation of the
relevant laws. One need not be an expert in malpractice or legal
ethics to conclude that it is precisely when a client seeks to go to the
limit of what the law might allow that a lawyer has a duty to ask hard
questions and exercise prudence. As Clarke puts it, "OLC lawyers had
a professional obligation to give accurate legal advice to their client,
whether or not the client's constituent wanted to hear it."' 48 Instead of
doing that, as David Cole summarizes, "on every question, no matter
how much law had to be stretched, the OLC lawyers reached the same
result-the CIA could do whatever it had proposed to do."49
Finally, in addition to failing to ask hard questions or provide
balanced legal analysis, OLC also failed to take the further step of
givingwise counsel. This omission may not be criminal, unethical, or
malpractice, but it is a marked failure nonetheless.
7. HOW DO THE ABUSES OF CWIL LIBERTIES UNDER THE GEORGE W.
BUSH ADMINISTRATION COMPARE TO THE INTERNMENTS OFJAPANESE
ALIENS AND JAPANESE-AMERICANS DURING WORLD WAR II?
My initial response is that Question Seven asks the impossible
because it provides no standard (legal, moral, or something else) for
making a comparison between things that are incommensurable.
How does one compare all of the alleged abuses of civil liberties
under the George W. Bush administration--such things as abuse of
wiretapping prohibitions and excessive immigration roundups, as well
as torture and other violations of international human rights and
humanitarian law-to a single, albeit enormous, event such as the
internments?
In addition, many of the worst alleged or documented abuses of
civil or human rights by the Bush administration took place in
locations that are outside, or at least arguably outside, the United
States. By contrast, the internment was a largely domestic phenome-
non. Yet during World War II, the Roosevelt and Truman administra-
tions also engaged in conduct that violated the civil liberties or
human rights of many people outside the United States.!° If these
48. Clark, supra note 42, at 468.
49. Cole, supra note 38, at 4.
50. See, e.g., GILES MAGDONOGH, AFTER THE REICH: THE BRUTAL HISTORY OF THE
ALLIED OCCUPATION (2007); ROBERT A. PAPE, BOMBING TO WIN: AIR POWER AND
COERCION IN WAR 87-136, 254-313 (1996).
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things were added to the equation, would the abuses during World
War II equal or surpass those committed by the Bush administration?
I think the answer would have to be yes, at least with respect to the
sheer numbers of people subjected to arbitrary or abusive treatment.
Other than the satisfaction of condemning all of the relevant
conduct, I am also unsure about the goal or value of such a compari-
son. Nor am I certain about how to perform the comparison so as to
produce an answer that is not a polemic. Perhaps it would be more
fruitful to compare deliberate policies during World War II and the
Bush administration to violate civil or human rights in ways that
appeared exceptional to large numbers of people at the time. That is
to say, it might make sense to ask what practices or policies seemed at
the time to be abusive conduct, as opposed to what seems in hindsight
to have been abusive. Although I can see some value to this method,
even this comparison requires some inquiry into where the standards
for "exceptional" or "abusive" come from. Many of the practices of
the Bush administration, for example, have been denounced as
abusive by human rights groups--and some have been struck down by
the Supreme Court-even as large numbers of people appear
indifferent or perhaps even approving.
All of that said, and with respect to the specific comparison that is
the focus of this question, there is certainly a good case that the
internments were worse. The Roosevelt administration concentrated
tens of thousands of people, including citizens, into camps. They
were not subjected to systematic physical abuse, but their lives were
upended, they were branded as potential enemies or traitors, and
many lost their livelihoods and projerty. Relatively few received any
kind of meaningful compensation, and the Supreme Court upheld
the internment policy. 52 Further, the total number of people interned
in the United States during World War II easily exceeds the number
of people in the United States whose civil rights were violated in ways
that are unique to the Bush administration. I suspect that it also
exceeds the number of people inside or outside the United States
whose rights were violated in ways unique to the Bush administration.
The best argument for contending that the Bush administration
comes out on the losing side of any comparison may require taking a
particular kind of progressive or whiggish view of American history
51. See COMM'N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL
JUSTIcE DENIED 117-34 (1982).
52, See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 98-99 (1943); see also Ex parteEndo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
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and politics, such that later Presidents not only are bound to learn
from and avoid the sins of their predecessors, but also that the bar of
appropriate or legitimate conduct continually rises. Since World War
II, the United States has often claimed to be a leader in human rights.
The Bush administration also advanced claims of this kind. At the
same time, however, it pursued policies that violated civil and human
rights. Even as it engaged in these violations, it also advanced legal
and political justifications for them, while continuing to claim
leadership on human rights. Perhaps the sheer brazenness of this
sequence makes the case that the actions of the Bush administration
are worse than Roosevelt's internment policy. But that answer might
require more faith in progress than I can muster.
8. DOES AL QAEDA POSE AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT TO THE UNITED
STATES?
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